Scared to Fly: The Effects of September 11th on the United
States Airline Industry
International Air
Transport Association. (2011). The impact of September 11 2001 on aviation. Retreived from http://www.iata.org/pressroom/documents/impact-9-11-aviation.pdf
In the informational document “The
Impact of September 11 2001 on Aviation”,
the International Air Transport Association (IATA) describes the economic
and security repercussions of September 11, 2001 on the United States economy
and air transport industry. Its audience is likely lawmakers, airline unions,
and airline employees. The IATA makes a very strong case that September 11 had
an extremely negative effect on the world as a whole. The IATA states, “it took
three years to recover the $22 billion revenue drop between 2000 and 2001.” an
extremely large impact, all of which stemmed from one tragic day. In the
airline world specifically, the IATA states that airline revenues fell from
$130.2 billion in 2000 to $107.1 billion in 2002. Total losses in the airline
industry between 2001 and 2005, according to the IATA, were $57.7 billion. With
this loss came huge layoffs in the airline industry. In 2000, US airlines
employed 520,600 workers. This number fell to 444, 700 by 2003, a 14.6%
decrease. (IATA 2011) In the United States alone, September 11, 2001 caused the
US commercial aircraft fleet to shrink by around 700 units. (IATA) This
decrease in aircraft took away more profit from airlines because their carrying
capacity would be reduced greatly. In addition to these economic impacts, the
IATA also examined several security factors as a result of September 11. Just a
few of these effects include the creation of the US Patriot Act and
Transportation Security Administration, as well as a $2.50 security fee for
each passenger boarding a flight originating in the United States.
This
article relates to my research very well. It details many important facts that
were discovered by the IATA about the toll that September 11 took on the
airline industry economically. It does a great job of describing exactly what
the effects were and how it affects the daily lives of not just airline
workers, but the United States and even global economy. It will be very easy
for me to incorporate these statistics into my research and relate them to the
effects of September 11 on the United States airline industry. The article also
details the security measures that were taken after September 11, which had a
pretty hefty price tag as well and caused a lot of potential airline passengers
to choose other means of transportation.
Ward, R. (2002)
September 11 and the restructuring of the airline industry. Dollars & Sense, (241), 16-20+. Retrieved
from http://search.proquest.com/docview/220959743?accountid=4117
In “September 11 and the
Reconstructing of the Airline Industry” published in Dollars & Sense, author Rodney Ward describes the downfall and
resurrection of the airline industry’s workforce. His intended audience is
economists in the airline industry. In the article, Ward argues, “the September
11 catastrophe hit the airlines hard, but it also opened the door for them to
accelerate the restructuring already underway.” Ward describes the airline
industry after September 11 as being transformed in to “lethal missiles.” As
one could imagine, workers in the industry were very shaken up by the event.
Some refused to work, while others exercised extreme caution while on the job.
According to Ward, some flight attendants inventoried the cabin for items that
they could use as weapons in the event of an attempted hijacking. Passengers,
too, were extremely cautious or reluctant to fly. Ward describes the passengers
who did fly, as “shell-shocked”.
This article relates to my research
by describing the airline working environment directly after September 11.
Flight crews were shocked beyond belief, and it showed in their work. It really
strikes me hard that the Federal Aviation Administration did not take more
immediate action in response to what happened on September 11. The airlines
were essentially left to fend for themselves when flights resumed on September
15th, a huge oversight by the government. Employees were also experienced mass
layoffs as a result of the attacks, leaving many without jobs. Even those who
didn’t get laid off experienced large pay cuts. All of these effects would fit
into my research paper very well because they are direct effects of September
11 on the lives of workers in the airline industry, pilots and flight
attendants specifically.
Brashear, S. Valeri, C. (2011). We will never forget. Air Line Pilot, October 2011, 19-22.
In “We Will
Never Forget,” an article published in the October 2011 edition of Air Line Pilot magazine, Captains Steve
Brashear and Carl Valeri describe to airline pilots and flight attendants their
experience on September 11 and how their lives have changed since that tragic
day. Captain Brashear was flying from Sacramento to Denver on the morning of
September 11. Right after he reached cruising altitude, his company sent him a
message saying “Possible hijack in progress at [New York] and it is shut down
due to World Trade Center crash of two large aircraft…” and two minutes later
they sent “nationwide ground stop in progress. All aircraft.” Captain Brashear
was at a loss for words. He told his copilot “they killed the pilots” because
no airline pilot would fly a plane into a building “even with a gun to our
heads”. Captain Brashear said he was never really scared until they told him to
land immediately and deplane passengers as fast as possible because that
instruction made it seem like the event was still in progress and they did not
know the extent of it. Once they landed, Captain Brashear, “like every American
that day, positioned [himself] in front of a TV screen and watched the grim
truth.” However, Captain Brashear found the good in September 11. He says, “On
9-11, the absolute purest in American spirit came to the surface and eventually
prevailed.” Captain Valeri sees September 11 as a chance to help others. He
volunteers helping pilots who have lost their jobs as a result of the economic
downturn in the airline industry.
This
article is a gem in the rough for me. It was a tough find, but it’s really good
because actual airline pilots wrote it. They describe their experience in the
air on September 11 as well as their feelings regarding safety and the state of
the airline industry’s economy. They also give some first hand accounts on
morale within the airline industry, which is really interesting because it
seems like it is really high. I’ll be able to use this article to back up facts
with actual quotes from airline pilots.
Logan, G. (2008).
The effects of 9/11 on the airline industry. USA Today. Retrieved from http://traveltips.usatoday.com/effects-911-airline-industry-63890.html
In the USA Today article “The Effects of 9/11
on the Airline Industry”, Gabi Logan assesses the various effects that the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have had on America. His intended audience
is USA Today readers. Logan describes
the attacks as “shaking the United States in a profound way”, and rightfully
so. Every industry felt the effects of September 11 in one way or another, but
according to Logan the United States airline industry had it the worst. Logan
states that “both the immediate reaction to the attacks and the long-term
repercussions have negatively affected the industry.” One of the largest
effects that September 11 had was that it cut passenger demand by 30% (Logan
2008). Another effect was the suspension of travel by many businesses. This
suspension mostly affected international routes are not frequented by leisure
travelers and operated by the United States’ largest and oldest airlines. Logan
also discusses some not quite as negative effects like the creation of the Air
Transportation Stabilization Board and the Transportation Security
Administration. The ATSB offered airlines $10 billion in loans to cope with
September 11, causing quite a controversy among fiscally conservative
politicians and citizens. The TSA was created to take over aviation security
that had been handled by the FAA in the past. This started off well, however
many air travelers began to get extremely irritated by the strict rules put in
place by the TSA. Overall, the hassle imposed by the TSA caused a 6% reduction
in airline travel and $1 billion in losses to United States airlines (Logan
2008).
This
article helps put my paper in perspective. Because it was written for the USA
Today audience, it really captures the minds of regular every day people. The
facts presented in the article are presented in a way that is very easy for the
public to understand, making it easier for me to relay information and
conclusions to readers who may not understand technical airline jargon. I can
especially use Logan’s points on the negative effects of the TSA and economic
downturn caused by September 11.
Martin, H.
(2011). 10 years after 9/11, the airline industry is looking up. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/10/business/la-fi-911-cover-sept11-airlines-20110911
In this Los Angeles Times article titled “10
years after 9/11, the airline industry is looking up,” author Martin Hugo
examines the present day effects of September 11 on the United States airline
industry, intended for Los Angeles Times readers.
Through quotes from industry experts, Hugo points out the progresses and
digresses of the industry since the attacks. Hugo details the airlines’
financial struggles by researching the additional fees that they have started
charging since September 11. Passengers in the United States alone pay over
$1.8 billion in additional fees, over a 400% increase over pre September 11
numbers (Hugo 2011). As a result of these fees, more passengers could not
afford to fly. In addition to these fees, Hugo recognizes the struggles caused
by the TSA. Roger Dow, president of the United States Travel Association,
points out that “a long line doesn’t improve security,” referring to the long
lines created by extensive TSA searches. Hugo attributes these long lines to
upsetting many frequent fliers. One interesting point that Hugo makes is that
the airlines are now “fortified” to take on another catastrophe such as
September 11. They are “prepared for
future shock” as Hugo puts it. Most of this is attributed to the fact that
airlines were “literally on their knees within an hour” of the September 11
attacks and now they know exactly how to deal with the situation with minimal
panic.
This
article is a good source because it includes a lot of quotations from industry
experts and airline spokespeople. It provides solid facts in order to back up
data from research and opinions of economists and industry workers. I will be
able to use these quotes in my paper to supplement hard facts with details on
how those statistics are realistically affecting the airline industry.
Transportation
Safety Administration. (2013). September 11, 2001 and TSA. Retrieved from http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/september-11-2001-and-tsa
In “September
11, 2001 and TSA,” the Transportation
Safety Administration makes public many facts about it’s existence as a result
of September 11 for the American public to read. The administration describes
its roots, goals, achievements, and how it will continue to improve. The
article contains many facts about the administration, presumably in an attempt
to improve its public image. Generally, the public views the TSA as a nuisance
that makes a lot of mistakes. While that may be how the TSA is portrayed in the
media, they would like to dispute that description. The Transportation Security
Administration was created through the Aviation and Transportation Security act
that was passed by the 107th Congress on November 19, 2011. The
original act called for 30 individual federally mandated criteria for the TSA
to meet. It was the largest civilian undertaking in history. The TSA was to
assume responsibility for all civil aviation security, which had previously
been the Federal Aviation Administration’s responsibility. To do this, the TSA
hired and trained enough staff to man over 400 commercial airports spanning the
entire United States. They did it all in under 12 months. Additionally, the TSA
was to develop a system to screen for 100% of all baggage by December 31, 2002.
They accomplished all of these tasks.
Written by
the TSA itself, this article obviously praises the administration. It ignores
many large flaws in the administration. However,
there aren’t many proponents of the TSA outside of the administration itself,
so really the only reliable source to get facts supporting the administration
is from the administration itself. This article will give me a little contrast
to the negative effects of the TSA. The TSA exists solely because of September
11, so it ties perfectly into my research.
Mackett, D.
(2011). Federal Air Marshals. Retrieved from http://www.secure-skies.org/fedairmarshals.php
In his
article “Federal Air Marshals”, author and airline pilot David Mackett gives
his opinion on the Federal Air Marshal program from an airline pilot
perspective. His intended audience is airline pilots as well as aviation safety
experts. Mackett describes the air marshal program as extremely weak before
September 11 because it only employed 33 Federal Air Marshals to protect over
600 million passengers in the air at any given time (Mackett 2011). September
11 gave the program a huge and much needed boost, however. Almost immediately
following the September 11 attacks, the Federal Air Marshal program was
expanded exponentially. The Federal government ramped up the number of Air
Marshals from 33 to over 4,000 as a result of September 11. They won’t release
the exact number for security reasons, however. The government also implemented
aircraft gun safety and technique training to other Federal agencies such as
the FBI and CIA and now requires agents of federal agencies to carry their
weapon with them on commercial flights (Mackett 2011). However, even with this
dramatic increase the number of Air Marshals, the program is not adequately
funded and has dwindled back down to a 1-2% coverage on United States domestic
flights. Federal Air Marshals often complain that they are overworked because they
are so short staffed. Mackett points out the danger of having fatigued marshals
who mar make irrational decisions carry weapons on aircraft and uses that as a
main point to argue for more funding towards the Federal Air Marshal program.
Even though
the Federal Air Marshal program existed prior to September 11, the attacks
boosted the program to the forefront of Congress’ table and became a force to
be reckoned with in the air. Carrying guns on airplanes is a very heated debate
topic and comes up every now and then in the news even today. A very
interesting argument can be made citing this article. While I agree that
Federal Air Marshals are a great force against terrorism, I don’t think that
It’s a very good idea to have them on commercial airliners if they’re tired,
understaffed, and poorly trained. I’ll use this article to support the rise of
the Federal Air Marshal program as a result of September 11 as well as the
positive effects of another line of defense against terrorism, but also the
drawbacks of a poorly funded program that places guns on United States
airliners.
Manning, B. (2012) Federal flight deck officer
program. Retrieved from http://www.posse.net/index.php/faq/36-federal-flight-deck-officer-ffdo-program
In “Federal
Flight Deck Officer Program”, Bob Manning gives a general background of the
FFDO program, written for airline pilots. Developed by the United State’s
Congress to provide a “first line of defense” against hijacking attacks such as
September 11, the FFDO program was a very innovative and progressive program
for its time. The thought of pilots carrying guns on airplanes would have
seemed absurd before September 11, however those horrific attacks made giving
guns to pilots a very plausible idea. In order to put this idea into action,
Congress passed the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002. The aim of the
act was to provide airline pilots the training and resources necessary to carry
guns on the flight decks of commercial airliners. Initially, the program was
budgeted at $25 million and was developed to be available to airline pilots
free of charge (Manning 2012). However, it became apparent that there would not
be sufficient funding after the first 4 years of the programs existence. The
cost of training pilots and keeping them qualified on yearly intervals turned
out to be much more expensive than congress was expecting. As a result, no new
FFDO’s are being trained. Only current FFDO’s are being re-qualified. Manning
makes a strong case to provide more funding to the FFDO program. After all,
they are our “first and last line of defense” against hijackers.
I agree
whole-heartedly with Manning’s opinion that more money should be allotted to
the FFDO program. If trained and funded properly, the FFDO program could
completely supersede the Federal Air Marshal program, freeing up the millions
that are tied into that program. Plus, if passengers know that their pilots are
armed, they will feel much safer flying. This article will provide a great base
for my argument in support of one of the few positive effects of September 11
on the airline industry. However, I will also use this article as another
reason why the public may be scared to fly on airliners. People don’t usually
put airline pilot, giant pressurized tube, and really high altitude and gun
together in the same sentence and think good thoughts. I can see both sides of
this argument and I’ll be able to use this article to make my point and also a
counter point.
By, F. L. (2001,
Nov 14). Airlines' woes didn't start on Sept. 11. Wall Street Journal, pp. 0-A.22. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/398800923?accountid=4117
In the Wall Street Journal article “Airlines’
Woes Didn’t Start on Sept. 11”, former
chairman and CEO of Continental Airlines, Frank Lorenzo, gives a unique
perspective to the airline’s economic downturn after September 11. Lorenzo says
that the airlines had been in an economic downturn for over a year before September
11, describing the situation saying, “Sept. 11 is the day the airline industry's
economic rubber band snapped, but it was already stretched to the breaking
point.” For example, United Airlines had lost over $600 million in the first 6
months of 2001 alone, before September 11. Lorenzo attributes this loss to
skyrocketing labor costs in the 1990s when many airlines and employees agreed
to new contracts with up to 20% pay increases for employees. Lorenzo described
the labor cost increases as “galloping out of control” in the 1990s. The new
contracts did not start to really hurt the airlines until early 2000, however.
In 2000, business travellers whose companies had purchased “unrestricted fare”
tickets, meaning airlines’ could charge as much as they wanted to for the
flight generated 35-40% of United States airlines’ profit. With the extremely poor stock market of the
early 2000s and “bad business conditions”, the airlines saw a huge cut in
business travel, decreasing their revenue by 15-18% even before September 11;
all of these factors contribute to the stretching of the rubber band that was
snapped on September 11.
Lorenzo
provides inside information and a unique perspective in this article. After
reading this article, I feel like I have a much better understanding of the
airline economy leading up to September 11 which will help me examine the
effects and changes of the economy after the attacks. I agree with the author’s
rubber band analogy, and I will definitely use that in my paper to describe the
airline economy leading up to September 11. Overall, this article provides a
unique perspective that will be useful in analyzing the airline economy before
September 11.
Garvey, J. F.
(2002). The airline industry: Post September 11th. Vital Speeches of the Day, 68(9), 277-280. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/221471615?accountid=4117
In a speech
titled “The Airline Industry: Post September 11th” given to the Aero
Club of Washington, the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
Jane Garvey, gives her synopsis of the airline industry after September 11. Mrs.
Garvey quotes President George W. Bush describing September 11 as “a dividing
in our lives and the life of our nation.” Garvey goes on to describe the
industry before September 11 as peaceful, mostly on time, and mostly stress
free. After September 11, however, the industry is described as swift,
decisive, and full of panic. There’s quite a difference between the airline
industry on September 10 and on September 11. Garvey also credits September 11
for transitioning the airline industry into more federal regulation and uptight
security. Garvey makes a strong argument in comparing September 11 to historic
events such as Pearl Harbor and historic hijackings. Through relating these
events that the United States has recovered from successfully in the past, Garvey
gives Americans confidence that the United States will recover from September
11 despite the turmoil.
After
reading this speech, I am really amazed at how fast things changed. The entire
airline industry completely fell apart in a matter of hours. Before reading this
speech, I had assumed that it took at least a few days to feel the effects of
September 11. This article is useful
because it quotes President Bush on the effects of September 11, and also
provides insightful commentary on the way that the industry was run and
regulated by the Federal Government before and after September 11. I’ll be able
to use this article to compare the way that federal officials view September 11
and the way that airline officials and industry experts view the event.
Finally, historic comparisons between events that Garvey mentioned in her
speech will make great comparisons.
No comments:
Post a Comment